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<<CH>> Defining and Challenging New Nationalism  
From Brexit to Trump, it is clear that the idea of nation has recovered its 
lustre. But Sivamohan Valluvan argues that an understanding of this deep 
nationalist cry requires a number of clarifications currently absent in 
popular analysis. These interventions include: revisiting the core historical 
principles of European nationalism, with a particular attentiveness to the 
place of race and racism; situating economic developments in a manner 
that does not overstate or misrepresent its influence; and also addressing 
the multiple ideological forms that new nationalism comprises of.  
 
 
Brexit represented the formal consolidation of a new electoral coalition in the 
UK: middle-income conservatives dotted across the green shires and provincial 
towns of England hitched to swathes of previously Labour-voting working-class 
Britain. Much ink has been spilt trying to account for the different motivations 
and socioeconomic circumstances that aligned to produce this new political pivot 
where, put proverbially, ‘middle England’ meets the ‘left behind’. Amid all the 
burgeoning and at times maddening speculation, the one seeming consensus 
across detractors and supporters alike is the observation that Brexit, and the 
feelings of resentment and powerlessness that fuelled it, was primarily framed 
by issues of ethnic difference and immigration.  
This is not to discount the various other themes that surfaced during the 
campaigns – claims pertaining to unaccountable bureaucracies, democratic 
deficits, the Euro’s crisis tendency, the drive towards centralised federalism, and 
even, from admittedly slightly quixotic leftist factions, the EU as an 
unapologetically neoliberal single-market body that undermines locally 
progressive politics. Yet, in spite of these no doubt significant criticisms, it is 
apparent that the assortment of more overtly xenophobic, race-baiting themes 
was ‘wot won the referendum’. Themes relating to immigration, refugees, 
Muslims, the spectre of Turkey, the Roma, the tyranny of anti-racist political 
correctness, and the European Court of Human Rights-sanctioned human rights 
restrictions that, among other excesses, supposedly impugn the integrity of 
British soldiers. The fact that populist firebrands across Europe, not least Marine 
Le Pen, received the result with a flurry of enthusiasm is not a mere footnote to 
the Brexit episode. It is instead an exemplary expression of the political reality 
that has come to define contemporary Europe. The well-documented 
transatlantic dimensions of this new political stage is attested to in Nigel Farage 
– who by any reckoning must be recognised as the charismatic lynchpin of the 
Brexit cause – decamping to the United States in order to bolster Donald Trump’s 
own nationalist assertion. An affinity now mirrored in prime minster Theresa 
May’s happy acquiescence to the tune of Trump.  
<<H1>>What is nationalism?  
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Many words have been penned trying to develop an analytic schema that can 
account for this malaise. A malaise that consigns both the social democratic and 
liberal left to the ignobly hapless position of bystander, observers to the history 
dramatically unfolding. This essay adds to that body of writing, advancing an 
argument that trades on two claims – this first, diagnostic, the second, political.  
First, it is clear that the idea of nation has recovered the lustre that had 
momentarily subsided, a hiatus that fed much hubristic speculation about the 
‘end of history’ and the teleological triumph of liberal, ‘post-ethnic’ democracy. 
Nationalism’s long historical arc in Europe was by my reckoning punctuated by 
two bouts of intensity: the age of Romantic expressionism and the major nation-
making projects it sponsored, as well as the early 20th-century era of 
protectionist mercantilism tied to fading imperial influence and economic 
instability that suffused two global wars, fascism, and the subsequent, not 
unrelated, crafting of the welfare state contract. The west is in the midst of a 
third such intensity.  
Nationalism might be initially understood as the set of discourses by which 
primary culpability for significant sociopolitical problems, whether real or 
imagined (depending on one’s political leanings), is attributed to various ethno-
racial communities who are understood as not belonging. Nationalism can of 
course be read through any number of other postulations. Such a significant 
feature of modernity, perhaps even modernity’s centrifugal achievement, is 
always about so much at once: culture, territory, democracy, the vernacular, 
alongside the ‘invention of tradition’ and monumentalised elite history. In short, 
nationalism pertains to the manner in which modernity frames the entire 
aspiration for peoplehood, community, and the attendant expression of 
sovereignty. But if one basic proposition about what constitutes nationalism is to 
be advanced, one proposition from which all else follows, it is the relationship 
between political discourse, ideology and nation that is the most helpful. Namely, 
western nationalism can be read as the formation by which a self-appointed 
normative community attributes its putative socioeconomic, cultural and 
security concerns to the excessive presence and allowance made to those 
understood as not belonging. Those who comprise the relevant field of non-
belonging include the variously constituted insider minorities but also various 
foreign peoples and international forces, some of which intertwine with and 
reinforce the pathologies attributed to those internal, generally non-white 
groups. (For instance, the intensification in anti-EU sentiment in the run-up to 
Brexit made extended reference to how the growing number of refugees in Calais 
and elsewhere in Europe threatened to replenish the already vilified internal 
minority groups with whom the potential refugees share an ostensible 
commonality – via Islam, skin colour, or country of origin).  
The contemporary constitutes one such moment where much political discourse 
projects a significant nationalist orientation. Increasingly shrill populist claims 
traffic in a number of core nationalist anxieties that hinge on certain iconic 
figures of non-belonging. Anxieties written upon the figure of the migrant, a 
figure that is articulated via multiple guises – as the labour migrant, as refugee, 
as asylum seeker, and, less frequently, as rapacious, uncouth foreign capitalists. 
Anxieties associated with the nihilist materialism attributed to the black inner 
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city, and the black male in particular. Anxieties stemming from the purported 
vulgar incivility of eastern Europeans (with the Roma becoming a particularly 
visceral signifier of this) amid their unsolicited arrival in the townscapes of 
provincial Britain. And, of course, the increasingly trenchant anxieties tied to the 
figure of the Muslim – as misogynist, indolent, communal, violent, fanatical, 
sectarian and, perhaps most invidiously, as protean and unpredictable. It is 
uncontroversial to note that the entire democratic landscape is being remade by 
the advances of these above political assertions, assertions that recommend 
harsher, uncompromising responses to the threats these multiple but often 
overlapping outsiders represent. Relatedly, nationalist solutions increasingly 
obtain a panacean value in the popular imagination, suggesting that various 
significant challenges will be magicked away through the emasculation of the 
significant others in the nation’s midst.  
The electoral power of nationalism was of course realised in particularly 
profound ways during the 2016 US presidential election. To quote the New 
Yorker, in the context of Trump’s seemingly carte blanche and largely improvised 
political programme, ‘voters are willing to tolerate’ various seemingly unpopular 
and highly contradictory political measures and personality warts ‘in exchange 
for the rest of Trump’s ethno-nationalist ideological agenda.’1 (Though as 
Nesrine Malik cautions, the current climate of vilification, not least Islamophobia, 
‘did not start with Trump, it is only reaching its climax.’2). Indeed, in the wake of 
Brexit and Trump, it seems banal to assert the contemporary importance of 
nationalism. Even The Economist pithily titled their 19 November issue, ‘The 
New Nationalism’.  
It is, however, the case that when critical attention is given to the rising 
nationalist mood, it often tends towards a well-worn economic reductionism. 
These accounts ascribe to nationalism some basic illusory properties that merely 
deflect or manage economic uncertainty and inequality. This frustratingly thin 
thesis understands nationalism as only applicable to momentary crisis 
resolution and as deflecting more pressing but inconvenient questions about 
economic stagnation and wealth concentration.  
Economic factors are certainly integral to the emergence of this new nationalism, 
given that they undeniably cultivate nationalist desires. Hostility towards 
national governments’ transfers to the EU or to international aid, claims over the 
financial largesse extended to refugees and other undeserving others, or 
competition for the diminished and seemingly diminishing resources that 
insecure and low-skilled labour affords, all operate as grist to the nationalist mill. 
The fact that nationalism has been emboldened at the very moment economic 
inequalities widen across advanced industrial countries and as economic 
deregulation and recession have engendered deeper senses of insecurity – which 
                                                             
1 Surowiecki J (2016) ‘Trump’s other tax ploy’, New Yorker, 17 October 2016. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/17/trumps-other-tax-ploy 
2 Malik N (2017) ‘Suddenly, Muslims are America’s pariahs’, Guardian, 29 January 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/29/muslims-america-untouchables-
donald-trump-ban-islamophobia 
 4 
if not always directly experienced is widely felt – cannot be a coincidence.3 
However, it is also apparent that such economistic explanations only get us so far 
and to see nationalism simply as epiphenomenal of economic factors misses the 
way in which nationalist appeals find resonance through both busts and booms 
and across stark economic divides. Put differently, it may be that it is not the 
economic that organises nationalism, but that nationalism and ideas of nation 
itself shape how material forces are comprehended and responded to.  
This recognition helps avoid rehearsing a simplistic either/or dichotomy 
between the economic and xenophobic racism. The economic explanation is 
commonly staged as either emerging from a rational, legitimate rage at an elite 
or arising from increased hardship amid deindustrialisation, outsourcing, rising 
living costs, the casualisation of labour and the dissipation of public services and 
social security provisions. This is contrasted to the more knee-jerk xenophobic 
racism that has always animated western modernity. That these two cannot be 
reconciled is a false dilemma. There are in turn three brief observations that help 
situate the economic in a manner that avoids attributing to it an exhaustive or 
misrepresented causality.  
First, despite regular intimations to the contrary, it is not just the ‘white working 
class’ that has experienced hardship as a result of the broader neoliberal 
consensus, most acutely experienced in the wake of the 2008 recession. In 
Britain, as elsewhere, many minority ethnic groups remain disproportionately 
worse off across a range of indicators in the areas of employment, housing, 
health and poverty, and have been severely impacted by both the recession and 
subsequent state austerity. The play to class as being the preserve of white 
people is therefore, at best, naive, and at worst, an incendiary racial nativism.  
Second, the voter base for new nationalist politics is not exclusively this oft-
invoked ‘white working class’. Its support also sources the middle and lower 
middle-classes, as well as capturing a not insignificant share of the affluent 
conservative vote4 – responding to similar homilies regarding moral decay, 
multicultural excess, and welfare dependency. Needless to say, the appeal of new 
nationalism confounds traditional class distinctions, and for that matter, always 
has. A defining hallmark of fascism was, after all, its ability to rescue from the 
ruins of industrial exploitation and fin-de-siècle alienation, an invigorating, 
putatively unifying ethnic ecology. Similarly, one simple context that 
immediately compromises the economic thesis regarding new nationalism is the 
case of Norway. Norway has seen over the past decades the slow emergence of 
the very same nationalist political discourse and electoral capture that is now 
being rehearsed elsewhere. The reality that Norway famously enjoys some of the 
highest living standards in the world, as premised on its well-managed petro 
boom, seems to do nothing to dispel the nationalist anxieties around 
                                                             
3 Shatz A (2016) ‘The Nightmare Begins’, London Review of Books Blog, 10 November 2016. 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2016/11/10/adam-shatz/the-nightmare-begins/ 
4 Antonsich M (2017) ‘The Return of the Nation – When Neo-nationalism becomes Mainstream’, 
Society and Space, 31 January 2017.  
http://societyandspace.org/2017/01/31/the-return-of-the-nation-when-neo-nationalism-
becomes-mainstream/ 
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immigration, Muslims and multiculturalism that are definitive of the nationalist 
formation.5  
Third, some try to equate nationalist populisms with certain new left, anti-
capitalist agitations – reading the nationalist rise as a misrecognised critique of 
contemporary neoliberalism, a critique that otherwise sits more naturally within 
the supposedly equally prominent left-wing agitations. If only. This wilfully 
optimistic reading of the political spectrum bundles the newly emboldened, 
often youth-driven leftist movements’ desire for change with the actual change 
and brokerage of power already exercised by nationalist factions. Only one 
brand of politics and mobilisation has successfully claimed the mantle of power – 
democratic, media and otherwise. That brand is nationalism. Brexit belongs to 
the real. Occupy and Momentum to the hopeful. The Front National belongs to 
the general, the Nuit debout protests to the particular. The People’s party and the 
Progress party, both long-term Nordic stalwarts of xenophobic alarmism, are in 
government, not merely aspirants. (Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece 
represent powerful counter examples but remain exceptions that prove the rule 
and are also buffeted by historical and present circumstances that render both 
contexts substantially different to the broader northern Europe clustering, and 
the place of Britain in particular, that is of interest here). Theresa May does not 
secure her otherwise absent mandate as premier through an appeal to the 
virtues of class solidarity, scrutiny of capitalist precarity, and an end to boom-
and-bust crisis cycles. No, rather more prosaically, May shores up her legitimacy 
through an unambiguously nationalist interpretation of Brexit as having 
constituted a straightforward proxy referendum on immigration. A proactively 
nationalist gamble that, according to Kenneth Clarke, the resident dissident of 
the Conservative party, would make even Enoch Powell blush.6 This is therefore 
not the age of populisms sui generis, as is suggested by John Jodis in his 
otherwise dazzling 2016 tour de force, The Populist Explosion.7 It is instead the 
age of nationalist-populism. This specification is not a minor quarrel. It instead 
fundamentally alters how we, as analysts and critics, diagnose the present.  
<<H1>>Which nationalism?  
There is, however, an underlying validity to the argument that the contemporary 
populist form is not merely right-wing and summarily conservative. But, herein 
lies the second observation upon which this essay’s argument turns. Namely, it is 
not that populisms of all different constitutions are currently competing in a 
largely unresolved contestation for ascendancy. It is rather that new nationalist 
populism, as the ascendant form, does absorb and rearticulate a wide variety of 
political constitutions – constitutions that traverse, crudely put, the Left–Liberal–
                                                             
5 Bangstad S (2014) Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia, London: Zed Books 
6 Guardian (2017) ‘Tories would even surprise Enoch Powell’, 31 January 31 2017.  
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/31/article-50-mps-must-honour-british-
peoples-leave-vote-david-davis-brexit 
7 Jodis J (2016) The Populist Explosion – How the Great Recession Transformed American and 
European Politics, Columbia Global Reports. (See also Jan-Werner Müller, another indispensable 
contemporary authority on the populist form.) 
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Right8 spectrum. Put differently, contemporary populism is nationalism, but 
nationalism’s current appeal and vitality lies precisely in its ability to draw upon 
an assortment of opposing ideological traditions, meanings and symbols.  
A passing glance at the historical theorisation of the nation-state helps situate 
this claim. As Hobsbawm and Ranger9 memorably clarified, nationalism hinges 
on the ‘invention of tradition’ that establishes a polity’s preferred historical 
bearing and its entrenching of what Benedict Anderson10 called ‘simultaneous 
temporality’ – a conception of peoplehood that ties the present to a particular 
imagining of the past but also the future. These narrative mechanisms culminate 
in engendering a profound sense of a timeless ‘We’. A ‘deep horizontal 
comradeship’, to again invoke Anderson’s distinctive phrasing, that placates 
other social divisions. The nation consequently offers modernity the 
fundamental lens through which it renders community, as the appeal to a shared 
entity of belonging beyond those whom we know and congregate with at any 
given moment. No other modern social formation has been able to generate the 
communitarian taxonomy and feeling that is, in any historical context, so central 
to how a society manages and expresses its sociopolitical transactions and 
ambitions.  
It is now certainly a truism, in the time after E.P. Thompson and Benedict 
Anderson, to note that the nation is a historically specific artefact, finding its 
proper expression only via the waves of Romantic nationalism and the 
subsequent mass society, state centralisation periods that succeeded it. This 
historical contingency of the nation was perhaps made most beguilingly 
apparent in Massimo d’Azeglio’s 1861 exhortation, as an ambivalent observer of 
the Risorgimento, ‘We have made Italy, now we must make Italians.’11 Less well 
understood, however, outside of the shamefully neglected canons of postcolonial 
and anti-racist scholarship, is that this construction of the national we is not in 
any sense benign. Rather, as scholars attuned to the nuances of racisms’ 
centrality to colonial modernity have observed, nation-states do not simply 
reflect pre-existing framings of ethno-national membership. Rather, societies 
actively produce and entrench ideas of nation, conceptions of the national subject 
(its ‘fictive ethnicity’ as goes the memorable phrase of Balibar12) that are 
necessarily exclusionary. To revisit an elementary sociological observation, in the 
making of the nation, definitional emphasis is in fact placed on who is not part of 
that nation. And crucially, this process of national self-definition through 
relational negation has always found ideas of ethno-race and broader 
                                                             
8 For an important early sketch of this emergent ideological multiplicity, see Kundnani A (2012) 
‘Multiculturalism and its Discontents: Left, Right and liberal’, European Journal of Cultural Studies, 
15:2 
9 Hobsbawn E and Ranger T (1983) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press 
10 Anderson B (1983) Imagined Communities, London: Verso 
11 For a thorough scrutiny of the statement’s perhaps apocryphal origins, see Hom SM (2013) ‘On 
the Origins of Making Italy – Massimo D’Azeglio and ‘Fatta l’Italia, bisogna fare gli Italini’, Italian 
Culture, 31:1  
12 Balibar E (1991) ‘The Nation Form – History and Ideology’ in Balibar E and Wallerstein E, Race, 
Nation and Class, London: Verso 
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civilisationist constructs of the ‘West and the Rest’13 to be its most instructive 
typology. As Paul Gilroy14 and David Goldberg15 have regularly noted, the fact 
that the European nation and ideas of race both began to find their thickest 
political and cultural definition at the same historical moment is no coincidence. 
It is instead the fundamental interplay that the very premise of European 
modernity regarding its sense of peoplehood rests and, and as recent events 
attest to, continues to rest upon.  
This brief theoretical digression regarding the historicisation of the nation is 
necessary here only in order to clarify an understanding of nationalism’s 
relationship to the more general concern of political ideology. Simply put, the 
nation, which is at its plainest a constitution of the normative ‘we’, has no 
inevitable political complexion other than that of its own exclusionary, ethno-
racial desires. Contrary to the often assumed affinity of the nationalist to the 
crudely pictured conservative, a more watchful analysis will note that nationalist 
sway at any given historical moment requires a particular kind of racial othering 
that is able to assemble an ideologically disparate collage. Comparable to what 
the sociologists Solomos and Back16 have called, in the course of summarising 
George Mosse’s important commentary on racism’s elasticity, ‘a scavenger 
ideology which gains its power from its ability to pick out and utilize ideas and 
values from other sets of ideas and beliefs in specific socio-historical contexts.’ 
I accordingly argue that any real reckoning with the current nationalist moment 
must better locate its mooring within very different and at times contradictory 
ideological clusters. This diffusion is in fact central to its current triumph. The 
ability of nationalist affirmation to find its sense amid contrasting ideological 
vocabularies and symbols plays a significant role in accounting for the 
intelligibility of contemporary nationalism to so many different factions and 
recesses constitutive of Britain’s current political scene.  
To give this claim some initial, albeit inadequate, definition, what is of interest 
here is the ability of contemporary nationalist discourses to appropriate and 
occupy a number of prominent platforms, each of which has had a substantial 
role in shaping the recent political history of western Europe. These multiple 
discursive heritages that become susceptible to nationalist co-option include: the 
liberal – as the self-arrogated and ethnically exclusive European claim to values 
of tolerance, free speech, secularism, the rule of law, alongside the more 
indefinite sense of liberal civility and everyday etiquette; the neoliberal – as the 
symbolic premium placed on a moral distinction between the deserving, self-
reliant and entrepreneurial capitalist self (‘homo economicus’) on the one hand, 
and the increasingly racially inflected understanding of the work-shy 
dependency of others; the conservative – as the nostalgic appeals to the moral 
                                                             
13 Hall S (1992) ‘The West and the Rest – Discourse and Power’ in Hall S and Gieben B (eds) 
Formations of Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 
14 Gilroy P (1987 [2002]) There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack – The Cultural Politics of Race and 
Nation, London: Routledge Classic; Gilroy P (2000) Between Camps – Nations, Cultures and the 
Allure of Race, London: Routledge 
15 Goldberg D (2001) The Racial State, Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
16 Solomos J and Back L (1996) Racism and Society, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 18-
19 
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and aesthetic clarity of provincial, imperial and/or rustic whiteness; and the 
communitarian left – as the welfare state and as anti-market, anti-globalisation 
sentiment, sentiments which are increasingly expressed through the allure of 
ethno-national community. Across these primary contours also lurk more finely 
tuned political lexicons, not least the disingenuously and instrumentally 
purposed feminist rhetoric of gender equality and sexual liberation, the 
conservationist feeling and visualisation of bucolic environmentalism, and even 
certain speculations about ideal urban life – in terms of regeneration, 
consumption and habitation.  
Recognising this expansive ideological map accordingly prevents the convenient 
attribution of the current malaise to an allegedly vulgar, largely emotive rump of 
fear and bigotry. Instead, any attempt to resist nationalism must first involve 
properly addressing its sophisticated affinity to multiple ideological forms, some 
of which we mistakenly consider to be inured from such trends. I am not in a 
position here to sketch further how these multiple ideological vocabularies all 
inform the deep nationalist cry being sounded across the west. But, importantly, 
I am not simply arguing that all political repertoires are capable of racism: that 
is, the left too can be racist or the liberal too can be nationalist. That is already 
very well understood and I have no wish to rehearse such truths. Rather, I am 
merely positing that nationalism, in order to become ideologically over-
determined, requires all these various repertoires. And part of the resistance to 
this nationalist wave, as much as it involves a critique of the economic conditions 
that render populist-nationalisms more likely, is also about clawing away at 
these ideological contradictions that comprise European nationalisms.  
This argument also constitutes a reminder to those with left or left-of-centre 
leanings that nationalism cannot be opportunistically gamed for other political 
ends. Nationalism is itself the populist play – all else is merely marshalled in its 
service. Of course, as Maya Goodfellow17 comments, to realise a popular politics 
without appealing to the totems of anti-immigrant, xeno-racism18 might seem a 
Sisyphean task. But it is the challenge that must be reckoned with, as otherwise, 
one merely gives further succour to the nationalist call; a call that might absorb 
other ideological positions but is ultimately promiscuous, only committed to its 
own ethno-racial exclusion and nativism.  
It is within this context that the ever-observant Ash Sarkar recently despaired 
via Twitter, ‘I asked last year if it was possible to do leftist populism without 
nationalism, and Labour apparently cba [can’t be arsed] to even try.’19 Sarkar’s 
frank frustration is warranted. There are increasingly vocal summons that ask 
the left to bargain with the nationalist case. This is of course a fool’s errand. 
Nationalism cannot be seen to be a viable vehicle for other political ends, not 
least, leftist collectivism. Nationalism is always, in the final instance, about its 
own exclusionary racisms – anything else is simply a convenient bedfellow 
rallied to make its appeal more likely.  
                                                             
17 Goodfellow M (2016) ‘ What should Jeremy Corbyn’s brand of leftwing populism look like?’, 
Guardian, 19 December 2016 
18 Fekete L (2001) ‘The Emergence of Xeno-Racism’, Race & Class, 43:2 
19 https://twitter.com/AyoCaesar/status/818768092209774592 
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